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The paper attempts to highlight the extent of corporate governance practices in 
strengthening the quality of reporting earnings in Malaysia over a period ranging from 
2000-2001 & 2005-2006. We propose three dimensions of earnings management, namely 
earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance and earnings smoothing to examine the impact of 
corporate governance using a sample of public-listed firms on Bursa Malaysia, in 
particular the existence of majority independent non-executive directors, board size and 
the influence of remuneration committee structure to reflect their significant roles in 
constraining earnings management thus ensuring greater accountability and transparency 
in financial reporting process. The results indicate that the likelihood of earnings 
management still prevail among sample firms however the influence of the practices on 
corporate governance is sporadic as such that the results are mixed and not supported with 
those studies using developed countries. The possibilities of the outcomes are then being 
explored and discussed. 
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Following the events of Enron and WorldCom in late 2001 and early 2002, Malaysia recently 
witnessed at least two corporate failures involving Transmile Group Berhad & Megan Media 
Holding Berhad due to accounting fraudulence. These have gained much attention of 
regulators and practitioners if a good corporate governance environment helps to reduce 
corporate failures for the purpose of protecting not only shareholders’ but stakeholders’ 
interests. Since the introduction of Sarbane-Oxley Acts in 2002, considerable reforms and 
prospective measures have been taken to strengthen corporate governance, particularly on the 
protection of minority shareholders’ interests, mechanisms and control on the effectiveness of 
the board of directors in monitoring managers and the degree of corporate disclosure to 
ensure greater transparency [46];[61]. In return, International organizations including 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and Work Bank have been pressing for effective implementation of corporate 
governance code and best practices at country and corporate levels [33]. Nonetheless, many 
have raised concerns if existing corporate governance practices are sufficient in preventing 
corporate failures. [51] argues that the recurrence of subsequent corporate failures ascertain 
the inadequacy of legislative responses and regulatory framework on corporate governance. 
While, some studies argue that managers may use their accounting discretions in influencing 
reported earnings as such less viable to reflect the firm’s true performance thereby 
undermining public-investing confidence in capital markets. Evidently, [48] examine the 
occurrence of earnings management across 31 countries where a high incident of earnings 
management is reported in countries with weak investor protection and less stringent legal 
environment. [44] explore further using 14 emerging countries that there is a growing need to 
adopt a more discipline and organized corporate governance structure to instil investors’ 
confidence where higher quality of corporate disclosure is ensured. It can be concluded that 
the aim to achieve a lower occurrence of earnings management and good corporate 
governance is equally important for both developed and emerging countries. 
 
2. Background & Motivation of Study 
 
Corporate governance is a serious and continuing process in emerging markets since the 
onset of 1997 Asian crisis. In response, the Malaysian Government realizes that enhancing 
corporate governance should be an essential agenda to strengthen transparency and 
accountability in the corporate sectors. Efforts to strengthen the aspects of good governance 
practices have commenced long before the Asian crisis with the introduction of new 
legislation or changes in the existing legislation, including Companies Act 1965 (revised in 
1985) where a minimum disclosure requirement is prescribed, the Banking and Financial 
Institution Act (BAFIA) in 1989, the Securities Commission Act (SCA) and the Futures 
Industries Act (FIA), both in 1993 [54]. The Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM)1
                                                 
1 Formerly known as the Registrar of Companies 
 
had initiated the Code of Ethics for Directors in 1996 in its effort of enhancing a better board 
of directors. Through the introduction of Financial Reporting Act 1997, the Securities 
Commission (SC) initiates the disclosure-based regulatory framework to replace the merit-
based framework in an attempt to enhance greater transparency under which the SC 
recommends the establishment of a Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) and Malaysian 




Efforts to develop better guidelines are intensified when the high level Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance was formed in 1999 with the introduction of the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (the Code). While the Code sets out principles and best practices on 
structures and processes that Malaysian listed companies may use in their operations towards 
achieving the optimal governance framework, it acknowledges that these rules relied on the 
managerial accountability and credibility of the board of directors [49]. These structures and 
processes include 13 board principles and 33 best practices, namely, board of directors, board 
composition, board size, procedures for recruiting new directors, directors’ remuneration, the 
board committees, their mandates and activities2 [61]. In addition, Bursa Malaysia3, hastens 
the effort of enhancing corporate governance by revamping its listing requirement4
This paper attempts to find evidence if earnings are managed within these boundaries by 
identifying the effectiveness of board of directors in monitoring the intensity of such 
behaviour. Thus, it is expected that a lower extension of earnings management will lead to 
better corporate governance practices
 in 2001 
where compliance with the prescription in the Code is voluntary while compliance with the 
disclosure provisions on the extent to which they have complied with the Code is mandatory 
[54]. One of the main highlights of the Code is the appointment of a minimum one-third of 
independent non-executive directors on the board membership for the purpose to strengthen 
the accountability and creditability of reported financial information. In this respect, it can be 
argued that the board of directors play a crucial role to ensure the compliance of their 
reported financial statements as closely as possible according to the accepted accounting 
treatments and guidelines set within the boundary. The board of directors may have the 
flexibility to abuse their discretions and propensities on reported earnings according to the 
needs of firms. This has suggested that the likelihood of earnings management practices do 
exist.  
 
5. We explore this association in 5 aspects  (1) if firms 
with good corporate governance practices reduce the degree of earnings management as 
measured by earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance and earnings smoothing; (2) if the 
existence of majority independent non-executive board of directors6
                                                 
2 Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (2000) 
3 Formally known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
4 Chapter 15, Paragraphs 15.26 and 15.27 of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
5 [48] record an endogenous link between corporate governance and quality of reported earnings 
6 Under Company Acts 1965 (revised 1985), a board consists of executive and non-executive directors. In this 
setting, an independent board is separated from controlling shareholders and managers while performing a 
supervisor role for the purposes of protecting shareholders’ interests and corporate governance generally [46] 
 (3) the impact of board 
size (4) if the existence of remuneration committees chaired by independent non-executive 
directors and (5) the level of the board’s remuneration disclosure in firms’ annual reports 
reduce the managerial behaviour of earnings management. In addition, this paper intends to 
offer similar or different perspectives on the association between corporate governance and 
earnings management characteristics from an emerging country comparable to those studies 
that are mainly grounded in developed countries. 
 
This paper is organized as such that literature search was conducted and reviewed to provide 
an insight of the academic scholars or practitioners arguments on different aspect of earnings 
management and corporate governance practices, followed by a description of hypotheses 
development, sample selection, methodology of the research framework as well as the 





3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
The studies in many international literatures have investigated different aspects of earnings 
management practice with exclusive linkages to corporate governance issues. The following 
summarized some of the major arguments as presented by different scholars on their views. 
 
3.1 Earnings Management  
 
Earnings management described by [36] where ‘managers may use judgement in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the firm, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers.’ Another definition is provided by [59] as a ‘purposeful 
intervention in the external financial process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain.” 
As such, the motivation for managers in managing earnings is discussed. [11] provide 
evidence that managers attempt to manage earnings when information asymmetry exists 
between investors and managers while [29] examine that firm’s concentrated ownership 
structure have negative impacts on the quality of reported earnings in which may give rise to 
the conflict of interests between managers and controlling owners7
The Malaysian high level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance recognizes that a 
good corporate governance lies firmly on a board’s structure and its composition of which the 
board structures include nomination, remuneration and audit committees while the board 
. [10], using a sample of 
US firms, report that managers, however, tend to manage earnings when firms report losses 
or earnings decline. Similarly, in the studies of [67] and [38], using a sample of Malaysian 
firms, such tendency is evident where managers manage earnings to avoid reporting losses. 
 
Some managers may manage earnings to increase or improve their compensation schemes or 
job security. Such evidence can be observed through [35],[31], [30] and [22] where managers 
smooth both current and expected future earnings upward or downward to achieve a desired 
earnings figure when a bonus agreement has been predetermined based on the future earnings 
of the firms or when their jobs are at state due to lower earnings is reported. Similarly, [7] 
and [16] provide strong evidence that CEOs attempt to manipulate reported earnings 
aggressively when their compensation is closely tied to firms’ share price performance. 
Managers may also attempt to overstate earnings by shifting earnings to the present at the 
expense of the future cash flows during period of Initial Public Offerings and Seasoned 
Public Offerings to meeting market expectations [68];[57]. Alternatively, managers may 
violate debt covenant by employing accounting discretions (1) to improve their debt 
constraints when a higher cost of future borrowing or new restrictive covenants are expected 
[21];[66]; (2) as a signalling property of expected increased in future cash flow performance 
[73]. A different observation is provided by [12], using a sample of listed firms across 46 
countries, explore the possibility that corporate social responsibility may play a role in 
motivating managers to abuse their discretions in reporting earnings thus increase the level of 
earnings management. They concluded that firms with corporate social responsibilities in 
mind tend not to manage earnings. Whatever the motivation, it can be argued that earnings 
management reduces earnings quality, thus decreases the effectiveness of corporate 
governance practices in protecting shareholders’ interests. 
 
3.2 Independent Non-Executive Directors 
 
                                                 
7 Highlighted in [41];[28] 
 
 
composition includes board size, directors’ representation and leadership8
Contrary to the above, evidences on insignificant association on board independence and 
earnings management are also been documented. Such association is reported by [52] where 
.  The role of a 
board of directors in ensuring the alignment between corporate goals and shareholders’ 
interests can be extended to its ability in monitoring firm performance to avoid the likelihood 
of earnings management behaviour. With respect to this study, 2 aspects of board 
characteristics are examined in this paper particularly on the existence of majority 
independent non-executive directors on the board and board size. It can be argued that these 2 
characteristics may prevail significant roles in influencing good corporate governance in a 
firm to protect shareholders’ interests. 
 
In an agency setting where the separation of control between managers and shareholders 
exists, managers may act opportunistically at the expense of shareholders’ interests [41]. As 
such, [28] and [62] argued that the presence of an independent board is crucial in monitoring 
and reducing these opportunistic behaviours where high quality and reliability of financial 
report is ensured to improve firm performance. In tandem, [47] suggest the ability of the 
board to act as an effective monitoring mechanism is highly dependent on its distinction from 
controlling shareholders and independence from managers. 
 
[19] provide a significant contribution where good corporation governance structure is 
realized in constraining management incentives to manage earnings in return improving 
quality of corporate disclosure. In relation, [9] selects a sample between 75 fraud and 75 non-
fraud US listed firms, implies that the existence of independent non-executive directors may 
not be sufficient in reducing the probability of accounting frauds, however, the effectiveness 
of such can be extended by incurring a higher proportion of independent non-executive board 
members where quality of financial reporting is ensured. Similarly, [1] provide additional 
evidence where the existence of independent board of directors significantly reduced the 
likelihood of financial frauds while strong independence is expected to emphasize greater 
corporate disclosure. Consistent with [14], [45] and [70], a board with the existence of 
majority independent non-executive board of directors is likely to reduce the earnings 
management practices, where a lower degree of abnormal accruals is detained, hence, a better 
financial reporting process leading to good corporate governance practices can be achieved. 
 
In addition, considerable studies across different countries also demonstrate similar results in 
defining the relation between earnings management and independence of board members. In 
particular, [60] study the earnings management in two dimensions, namely earnings 
smoothing and earnings aggressiveness across 25 emerging countries, conclude that firms 
with good corporate governance tend to conduct less earnings management thus increased of 
firm performance is expected through share price performance. Consistent with [26] where a 
reduction of discretionary accruals to avoid earnings losses and declines is observed with 
greater proportion of independent non-executive directors after corporate governance 
reformation in UK, hence, improve the quality of financial reports. The study further suggests 
that the effectiveness of the board in monitoring management is highly depending on the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors. Similarly, [53] and [18], use a sample of 
Canadian and Australian listed firms respectively to show the extent on the existence of 
majority independent non-executive directors in reducing earnings management where a 
better corporate governance structure is expected. 
 
                                                 
8 Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (1999) 
 
 
the study uses a sample of younger and smaller UK firms that the existence of majority 
independent board of directors provides no evidence in reducing earnings management, thus 
the construction of such has no impact on financial reporting quality. Similarly, [55] 
investigate how the board composition may increase the board’s ability to protect 
shareholders’ interests by examining the level of abnormal accruals and find that the higher 
proportion of independent non-executive directors does not improve the board’s effectiveness 
in monitoring earnings management activities. Likewise, [63] and [13], using Indonesia and 
Korean listed firms respectively, in post-crisis period, reveal that there is no association 
between the existence of majority independent non-executive directors and earnings 
management practices. Following on [19], [56], [45] and [60], H1 = Earnings management is 
negatively associated with the existence of majority independent non-executive directors in a 
board 
 
3.3 Board Size 
 
Board size is an important element in board characteristics and conceivably correlated with a 
board’s independence [72]. Research has indicated that board size may prevail a board’s 
governance ability in monitoring firm performance thus reduces the degree of earnings 
management in a firm. [50] recommend a board size should be an average of eight to nine 
members where additional members may constrain the board’s ability to communicate 
effectively. [32] argue a smaller board size with four to six members might be more effective 
in making timely and crucial decisions to obscure firm changes strategically during periods of 
external shocks. They further claim that large and diverse board may lead to agency problems 
as verified by [42]. Likewise, [72] demonstrate a significant inverse association between 
board size and firm performance where a board’s diversity is observed with larger board in 
US listed firms, hence, a smaller board with less than ten members is more effective in 
monitoring management. [25] also provide a similar result when using a sample of small and 
medium-sized Finnish firms. Therefore, it can be argued that as board size decreases, 
problems in communication and coordination in unlikely to occur thus the board’s ability to 
monitor management increase thereby leading to a lower degree of earnings management. 
 
In contrast, different perspectives on board size significance have also been investigated if 
larger boards are associated with greater firm performance where corporate governance 
practices are strengthened in ensuring higher quality of reported earnings. [17] suggest that an 
ideal board should consist of reasonable proportional mix of independent/interdependent and 
executive/non-executive with corporate and financial expertise to prescribe for a better 
capital governance structure. Their studies indicate a significant positive association between 
larger board size and firm performance. Consequently, [70] indicated that a larger board with 
higher proportion of independent non-executive directors are better at constraining earnings 
management with a lower degree of discretionary accruals. [14] also find similar evidence to 
which a larger board has a tendency to reduce the likelihood of earnings management 
particularly if the board consists of majority independent non-executive directors. In 
accordance with [17], [14] and [70], H2 = Earnings management is negatively associated 
with larger board size 
 
3.4 Executive Remuneration 
 
The opportunity to manage reported earnings arises when executive directors are rewarded 
for their efforts in aligning the shareholders’ interests with firm financial performance [6]; 
 
 
[72]. As suggested by [70] and [7], executive remuneration schemes may compromise a 
board’s independence in performing its monitoring role where poor remuneration packages 
may encourage managers to manage earnings. To date, limited studies have been explored to 
provide conclusive evidences in explaining the impact of corporate governance structure 
particularly the role of remuneration committee as an effective governance mechanism in 
constraining earnings management practices. In line with the corporate governance code and 
best practices, a remuneration committee has the responsibility to make necessary 
recommendations in designing the right incentives and remuneration packages to attract and 
retain capable executive directors in enhancing firm profitability [4]. As such, the 
remuneration committee is expected to align directors’ compensation on firm financial 
performance. Evidently, [16] report that incentive-based remuneration may influence 
corporate governance structure when earnings are adjusted to reflect better firm performance. 
Following the suggestions by [45] and [4] where greater remuneration committee 
independence with lower occurrence of earnings management may be achieved by appointing 
an independent non-executive directors as the chair, H3 = Earnings management reduces 
with the existence of a remuneration committee chaired by an independent non-executive 
director  
 
It can be argued that good corporate governance structure should be able to constrain 
excessive remuneration paid to executive directors thus improve the credibility and 
transparency in remuneration disclosure on reported financial statements. [39] highlight the 
importance of such disclosure to reduce excessive remuneration, increase shareholders’ 
control over the mechanism of executive pay structure in strengthening shareholders’ 
interests. Supported by [53] where the extent of remuneration disclosure may reduce 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders and enable the board to 
effectively monitor management decisions, hence, H4 = Earnings management reduces with 
greater disclosure of the boards’ remuneration details in the firms’ annual reports 
 




A full dataset of 40 public-listed firms in Main Board of Bursa Malaysia was selected 
excluding firms classified under the finance sector because of their unique features and 
differences in the reporting requirement in compliance with regulations of Bank Negara 
Malaysia, while, the sample included non-financial firms represented by construction and 
properties, industrial products, trading and services, plantation and consumer products. The 
sample period is ranging from 2000-2001 & 2005-2006 to examine to what extent corporate 
governance practices has influenced the degree of earnings management as measured by 
earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance and earnings smoothing respectively. The rational of 
selecting the period of 2000-2001 is when corporate governance best practices are just being 
promoted while period of 2005-2005 is employed to examine the impact of corporate 
governance after 5 years of corporate regulatory reformation and changes in influencing the 
quality of reporting in Malaysia. Information on the research variables were then extracted 
from the annual reports and sorted using a dataset by listing each firm’s board characteristics, 
structures and relevant financial data.  
 




The literature has identified various methodologies for the measurement of earnings 
management. The most commonly used models which focus on earnings manipulations on 
accruals as an approximation for earnings management includes [43] and Modified Jones 
Model [19]. In accordance with [8], [48] and [38] we use earnings aggressiveness, loss 
avoidance and earnings smoothing to capture the ways in which firms may manage earnings. 
 
4.2.1 Earnings Aggressiveness 
 
According to [8], earnings aggressiveness is observed when managers tend to delay the 
recognition of losses while expedite the recognition of gains which is a direct opposite of 
accounting conservatism practices when managers tend to incorporate losses quickly  while 
incorporate gains slowly in a firm’s financial statement. Consistent with [35], [43], [19] and 
[48], earnings aggressiveness is measured at a point in time as the median for firm k, year t, 
where accruals are divided by lagged total assets.  We calculate scaled accruals, drawing from 





SACCkt is scaled accruals for firm k, year t that excludes depreciation and amortisation , this 
is because, practitioners focus on earnings before depreciation and amortisation; ktCA∆  is 
change in total current assets for firm k, year t; ktCL∆ is change in total current liabilities for 
firm k, year t; ktCASH∆ is change in cash for firm k, year t; ktLTD∆ is change in current 
portion of long-term debt for firm k, year t; and TAkt-1 is total assets for firm k, year t-1. 
Median observation of scaled accruals is observed in order to minimize the influence of 
extreme observations. This follows the notation that the higher the median of scaled accruals 
of firm k in year t, the higher is the earnings aggressiveness in firm k, year t. 
 
4.2.2 Loss Avoidance 
 
As suggested by [10], managers may avoid reporting of earnings losses and decreases. In line 
with [8], to detect if earnings management take place as a result of avoiding earnings losses, 
firms with small positive earnings (small negative earnings), using zero earnings as the 
threshold, firms net operating incomes are scaled by lagged total assets, which then between 
0 and 1% (between 0 and –1%, respectively). A ratio of number of firms with small positive 
earnings minus number of firms with small negative earnings divided by their sum is then 
determined.  The higher this ratio for a firm in year t, the higher is the loss avoidance in that 
firm for the year in terms of avoidance of reporting earnings losses. This measure is based on 
[10], a variant of this measure is employed in [48].  The premise of this measure is that many 
small positive earnings numbers and few small negative earnings numbers is indicative of 
managers trying to avoid losses, which according to [23] is the most salient benchmark for 
earnings.   
 
4.2.3 Earnings Smoothing 
 
Earnings smoothing is expected when managers use their discretions to smooth earnings 
upward or downward depending on the circumstances of a firm to conceal the true economic 
performance of the firm [48]. Following [8] and [60], cross-sectional correlation between the 
change in accruals and the change in operating cash flows are estimated, both scaled by 
 
 
lagged total assets for each firm k, for each year t.  Accruals are obtained from (1) above, 


















SpearmanoothingEarningsSm ρ ……………...…………..…….(2) 
This measure on average is expected to be negative because some degree of natural 
smoothing is expected in accounting numbers. The higher the degree of negative correlation, 
the more likely that earnings are smoothened.  This inverse relationship is to obscure the 
variability in underlying economic shocks.   
 
4.3 Regression Model 
 
All hypotheses are tested through a multivariate regression model where the independent 
variables consist of four corporate governance variables and two control variables, namely 
firm size and leverage ratio are taken into account. The model suggests that good corporate 
governance may reduce the degree of earnings management as proxied by earnings 
aggressiveness, earnings smoothing and loss avoidance. Table 1 provides a summary of the 
operationalization of the variables. 
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TABLE 1: REGRESSION VARIABLES AND DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition9 Expected Association with 
Earnings Management 
 
INEDs The existence of majority independent non-executive directors  Negative 
Board Size Number of total directors on the board Negative 
Disclosure Disclosure requirement in the annual report of the details of 
remuneration to each director, dummy variable being 1 for 
firms with remuneration disclosure and 0 otherwise 
Negative 
Committee Remuneration Committee chaired by an independent non-
executive director, dummy variable being 1 for firms with 
remuneration committee chaired by an independent non-
executive director and 0 otherwise 
Negative 
Firm Size Total Assets Positive 
Leverage Ratio Total Debt/Total Assets Positive 
 
As suggested by previous studies, control variables on firm size and leverage ratio are 
imposed to reduce sample selection bias. [58] find an insignificant association between firm 
size and the level of discretionary accruals. While, [17] indicates that smaller firms with 
fewer board members tend to perform better Nonetheless, [13] show that firm size and 
leverage ratio is positively associated with the existence of majority independent non-
executive directors on the board. [21] and [66] report that managers tend to manage earnings 
aggressively when higher cost of debt may occur due to excessive future borrowing, thus the 
level of discretionary accruals is high when firms are closed to debt covenant violation. 
Similarly, [73] provides a positive association between the level of discretionary accruals and 
leverage ratio. In response, firm size and leverage effects are captured to impact the deviation 
which may affect general outcomes of the regression model, thus the natural log firm size is 
proposed to provide better estimation and more meaningful interpretations. Assumptions of 
                                                 
9 In line with the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance and KLSE revamp listing requirements 
 
 
multi-collinearity and normality using Pearson Correlation Coefficient10 and standard 
statistical tests on skewness and kurtosis11
 
 are also analysed. 
5. Discussion of Results 
 
5.1 Extent of Earnings Management 
 
TABLE 2: EARNINGS MEASUREMENT FOR YEARS 2001 AND 2006 
Median Ratio Spearman Correlation 
2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 
1. Earnings   Aggressiveness 0.0015 0.0021     
2. Loss Avoidance   0.4872 0.7692   
3. Earnings Smoothing     -0.564*** - 0.760*** 
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
1. The higher median of scaled accruals implies firms are more prone to conduct earnings aggressiveness 
2. The higher ratio implies firms are more prone to reporting earnings losses 
3. The higher degree of negative correlation implies firms are more prone to smooth earnings 
Table 2 presents the results in all three dimensions of earnings management measurement 
among Malaysian listed firms. The sample firms are generally not aggressive in reporting 
earnings with small positive median scaled accruals observed for 2001 and 2006. Consistent 
with [38] and [60] suggesting that the sample firms adopt a more conservative accounting 
approach in reporting earnings. On contrary, firms are actively avoid reporting earnings 
losses and declines particularly in 2006 where firms have stronger incentives to shift earnings 
upward to gain a positive earnings figure. These results are supported by [10], [67], [55] and 
[38] where firms adopt loss avoidance behaviour. Similarly, a greater degree of negative 
correlation between the changes in operating cash flows with the changes in accruals is 
observed in 2001 and 2006, suggesting that firms are very likely to smooth earnings to 
obscure the variability of underlying economic performance to reflect higher expected future 
profitability. Consistent with [19], [73] and [60], earnings are significantly smoothen in the 
countries of their studies including US, UK, China and emerging countries respectively. In 
summary, it can be concluded that the practice of earnings management in Malaysia still exist 
to a certain extent despite of greater mechanisms imposed in promoting good corporate 
governance environment to ensure higher quality on corporate disclosure.  
 
5.2 Data Description and Basic Statistics 
 
TABLE 3: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
 2001 2006 
Percentage of firms with the existence of majority  INEDs 62.5% 90.0% 
Percentage of firms with remuneration committee chaired by INEDs 32.5% 65.0% 
Percentage of firms with remuneration disclosure 7.5% 17.5% 
Table 3 identifies the extent of corporate disclosure to which firms have complied with the 
Code over a 5-year period. It can be suggested that there is an improvement to which firms 
recognize the roles and responsibilities of board of directors in monitoring management 
behaviour in ensuring the integrity and accountability of financial reporting disclosure. This 
is evident where an increased number of firms to include majority independent non-executive 
directors over the 5-year period grow from 62.5% to 90% while the importance of 
independent non-executive directors is also realized in the remuneration committee by 
appointing an independent non-executive director as the Chair, (an increased of 32.5% to 
                                                 
10 [54] and [2] suggest that multi-collinearity among variables must not correlate above 0.8 
11 [2] and [34] suggest that data is said to be normal if the skewness is within ±2 and kurtosis ±3 
 
 
65%). It can be argued that firms tend to increase the independence of board of directors to 
provide signals to public revealing their intention for corporate governance reformation [13]. 
However, the extent to which number of firms to disclose information on executive 
remuneration schemes is minimal even though there is a slight increase of firms participated 
(from 7.5% to 17.5%) over the 5-year period. 
TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON A SAMPLE OF 40 FIRMS FOR YEARS 
2001 & 2006 
Variable 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 
Earnings Aggressiveness -0.399 -0.307 0.313 0.608 0.032 0.008 0.084 0.137 1.769 1.587 3.168 9.587 
Loss Avoidance -0.092 -0.375 0.319 0.258 0.051 0.051 0.077 0.096 1.327 -1.886 2.909 9.740 
Earnings Smoothing -0.999 -0.999 0.977 0.989 -0.593 -0.618 0.650 0.626 1.524 1.474 0.886 0.765 
Board Size 4 4 13 14 8.2 8.3 2.090 1.937 0.253 0.509 -0.290 1.063 
INEDs 0.111 0.222 0.666 0.666 0.351 0.403 0.125 0.092 0.456 0.540 0.409 0.760 
Remuneration Committee 
chaired by INEDs 0 0 1 1 0.33 0.65 0.474 0.483 0.777 -0.654 -1.473 -1.658 
Remuneration Disclosure 0 0 1 1 0.08 0.18 0.267 0.385 3.354 1.778 9.736 1.220 
Log Firm Size 4.851 4.261 7.142 7.415 5.983 6.099 0.531 0.631 0.219 -0.036 0.011 0.758 
Leverage Ratio 0.0002 0.009 1.031 1.611 0.337 0.402 0.246 0.325 0.873 1.626 0.998 3.967 
 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics of explanatory variables used in this study where 
means are observed. The results indicated that the mean ratios on loss avoidance for the years 
2001 and 2006 are fairly constant with an average of 0.051 while the mean correlations on 
earnings smoothing are negative with -0.593 in 2001 and -0.618 in 2006. The mean medians 
on earnings aggressive show a significant deviation between 2001 and 2006 with 0.032 and 
0.008 respectively (closer to zero), suggesting that earnings aggressiveness has reduced to a 
lesser extent. The mean percentages of majority independent non-executive directors on the 
board have increased from 35.1% to 40.3%. As suggested by [9] and [45], the most 
appropriate mean percentages on independent non-executive directors for a board’s 
independence should be more than 50%. Thus, it can be argued that the board independence 
may insignificantly influence the degree of earnings management in Malaysia. On average, 
Malaysian companies have about eight board members, which is within the board size 
recommended by [50] and [56] for a board to effectively monitoring managerial behaviours. 
The means for log firm size remain an average of 6 for both years indicating no major 
structural changes in the sample firms whereas the mean ratios on leverage are relatively high 
with an average of 0.34 and 0.4 for both 2001 and 2006. This implies that Malaysian firms 
often maintain close relationship with major financial providers. Generally, the tests on 
independent variables’ standard skewness and kurtosis suggest that the data set collected are 
fairly normalized and remained representative apart from the remuneration disclosure in 2001 
with skewness of more than +2.  
 
TABLE 5: PEARSON CORRELATIONS FOR YEARS 2001 & 2006 


















Aggressiveness 1         
Loss Avoidance 0.201 1        
Earnings 
Smoothing -0.146 -0.18 1       
Board Size 0.327** 0.154 -0.341** 1      




***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 5 describes the correlation coefficients of all variables studied in this paper. The 
correlation matrix confirms that that there is no multi-collinearity exists among variables 
since none of the variables correlate above ±0.8. A positive correlation is observed between 
board size and remuneration committee chaired by independent non-executive directors with 
0.398(ρ<0.05) in 2001, suggesting that as the number of board members increases, the 
remuneration committee is likely to be chaired by independent non-executive directors. In 
2006, however, the association between these 2 variables is insignificant, While a negative 
association is observed between remuneration disclosure with remuneration committee 
chaired by independent board of directors at -0.352 (ρ<0.05), the coefficient for percentages 
of independent board of directors and board size is also negatively correlated at -0.414 
((ρ<0.01). 
 
5.3 Regression Results 
 
TABLE 6: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR YEARS 2001 & 2006, 
N = 40 
Variable Predicted Signs Earnings 
Aggressiveness 
t-test Significance 
2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 
Constant    -2.520 -0.666 0.017** 0.510 
Board Size - 2.471 -0.449 0.019** 0.656 


















- -0.626 -1.228 0.536 0.228 
Remuneration 
Committee 
chaired by INEDs 




   
Remuneration 
Disclosure -0.055 -0.121 -0.051 0.156 0.045 0.208 1   
Leverage Ratio 0.023 -0.108 -0.112 -0.275 -0.214 -0.122 -0.179 1  
Log Firm Size 0.319** 0.008 0.041 0.139 0.083 -0.013 0.085 0.229 1 


















Aggressiveness 1         
Loss Avoidance 0.377** 1        
Earnings 
Smoothing -0.129 -0.243 1       
Board Size 0.027 0.223 -0.018 1      
INEDs 0.069 -0.263 0.053 -0.414*** 1     
Remuneration 
Committee 
chaired by INEDs 




   
Remuneration 
Disclosure -0.278 0.003 -0.293 0.065 -0.017 -0.352** 1   
Leverage Ratio -0.4*** -0.566*** -0.109 -0.121 0.04 -0.025 0.039 1  
Log Firm Size 0.106 0.008 0.041 0.269 0.031 -0.006 0.101 0.104 1 
 
 
Leverage Ratio + 0.591 -2.819 0.559 0.008*** 
Log Firm Size + 1.362 1.238 0.183 0.225 
R2  0.261 0.310     
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.184 




Variable Predicted Signs Loss Avoidance t-test Significance 
2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 
Constant    -0.066 -0.591 0.948 0.558 
Board Size - 1.115 -0.817 0.273 0.420 




- -1.031 1.678 0.310 0.103 
Remuneration 
Disclosure 
- -0.780 0.526 0.441 0.603 
Leverage Ratio + -0.498 -5.064 0.622 0.000*** 
Log Firm Size + 0.094 3.127 0.926 0.004*** 
R2  0.084 0.549     
Adjusted R2 -0.082 0.467 
Significance 0.800 0.000*** 
 
Variable Predicted Signs Earnings Smoothing t-test Significance 
2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 
Constant    -0.183 -0.827 0.856 0.414 
Board Size - -1.696 0.568 0.099* 0.574 




- -0.461 -1.650 0.648 0.108 
Remuneration 
Disclosure 
- -0.176 -2.352 0.861 0.025** 
Leverage Ratio + -0.923 0.780 0.363 0.441 
Log Firm Size + 0.128 -0.122 0.899 0.904 
R2  0.224 0.172     
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.021** 
Significance 0.182 0.360 
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 6 reports multivariate regression results for all three earnings measurement in both 
2001 and 2006 respectively. Low values of adjusted R2 for all 3 earnings measures are 
observed in the year 2001 indicate that there are other factors that may strongly explain the 
variability in the level of earnings measurement. However, an improved adjusted R2 are 
observed for all 3 measures in 2006 which suggest a stronger explanatory power in detecting 
the variation in earnings management activities. Contrary to our expectations, there is no 
meaningful relation between the proportion of independent non-executive director with all 3 
earnings measures, thus it can be concluded that H1 is not supported. This result is consistent 
with [63], [13] and [55] that the existence of majority independent non-executive directors 
has no significant economy ties to the firms beyond their jobs as directors. Likewise, [34] 
raise serious doubt on the ability of one-third of independent non-executive directors for 
Malaysian firms in monitoring managerial behaviours independently to reduce earnings 
management activities due to the fact that most independent non-executive directors are 
 
 
selected not for their expertise and experience but more often for political reasons and 
legitimate requirements.  
 
Conversely, the size of board exhibits significant negative association between earnings 
aggressiveness at 0.019 (ρ<0.05), and loss avoidance behaviour at 0.099 (ρ<0.1), in 2006, 
suggesting that larger board size constrains earnings management activities. Consistent with 
[70] and [14] where a larger board is expected to improve the quality of monitoring 
management behaviour, thus enhance in the reliability of financial disclosure. This result is 
contrary to [42], [9] and [25] where smaller boards provide more controlling effects than 
larger boards. Given H2 results are not consistent for both periods of study, particular in 2001 
where no significant association is detected, it can be argued that little support is found 
between the association of board size and earnings measurement in 2001. 
 
As highlighted in Table 2, the extent to which firms disclose their remuneration scheme is 
minimal thus its impact on the degree of earnings management practices is insignificant for 
both period of study, apart from earnings smoothing in 2006 with 0.025 (ρ<0.05), in 
explaining the quality of remuneration disclosure in mitigating earnings management 
activities, which lead to insignificant evidence to accept H4. As suggested by [53], managers 
wish to retain the flexibility to engage in earnings management may have incentives to limit 
the remuneration disclosure. Contrary to [45] and [5], an insignificant association is observed 
between the existence of remuneration committee chaired by independent non-executive 
directors with all 3 earnings measures, thus indicating that H3 is not supported.  
 
Among the control variables, the significance of leverage effects is detected in 2006 with 
earnings aggressiveness at 0.008 (ρ<0.01) and loss avoidance at 0 (ρ<0.01) while limited 
evidence is presented between earnings smoothing and leverage ratio. This result is supported 
by [22], [73] and [66] where firms with high leverage ratios are more inclined to engage in 
earnings management activities. In contrast to [58], firm size does provide a strong 
correlation with loss avoidance in 2006 where larger firms are more prone to manage 
earnings when negative earnings are reported. 
 
6. Limitations and Conclusion 
 
This paper attempts to examine the extent of corporate governance practices in enhancing the 
quality of reporting earnings with particular attention to the board of directors’ characteristics 
including the independence of board of directors, board size and directors’ remuneration 
disclosure. Overall, the results above show the sporadic extent of earnings management in 
influencing corporate governance in Malaysia. The results also show that the existence of 
majority independent non-executive directors provide an insignificant role in constraining 
earnings management practices within the firms. A plausible explanation may be based on (1) 
lack of knowledge in firms’ activities [47]; (2) lack of expertise [2],[3]; (3) lack of ownership 
interest of the firms they monitor [55]; (4) earnings management can be viewed as beneficial 
to shareholders to improve the informativeness of reported earnings driven by a firm’s 
profitability [56]. 
 
This study encounters significant obstacles which reduce the validity of findings where 
results are limited by the accuracy of the models applied to isolate discretionary accruals as 
suggested by prior studies as well as the sample size that may limit the generalization of the 
results. The impact of earnings management can then be further explored through other 
 
 
elements on corporate governance variables including the existence of independent audit 
committee, concentration of ownership structure and political influences which are unique in 
Asian emerging markets. Likewise, low explanatory power of the regression model used in 
this study may not be substantial enough in explaining whether the earnings management 
practices have been reduced due to the enhancement of corporate governance regulatory 
framework and financial reporting structure in improving the transparency and accountability 
on the reported financial statements. This may be due to strong heteroscedasticity between 
corporate governance variables and earnings management measurements. Therefore, it is 
suggested that further research studies may explore by using different research methods, 
namely accounting performance measures such as Tobin’s Q. 
 
Nevertheless, corporate governance development in Asian emerging markets are still far 
behind comparatively to developed countries such as US and UK to which the initiatives to 
promote good practices have been either ignored or applied in spirit of compliance with legal 
requirements rather than driven by firm performance and capital market pressures 
[69];[34];[63]. It is obvious that Malaysia requires the development of greater transparency 
and accountability in the relationship between board of directors, management and 
shareholders with more effective governance arrangement where investor protection can be 
enforced while shareholders’ interests are safeguarded for market mechanisms to function 
competitively. This may suggest the need for further constructive thinking and ideas in 
adopting corporate governance model in Malaysia with proper consideration of socio-
political-economical environment of the country in promoting corporate governance 
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